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ABSTRACT
This article explores the historical, practical and consequences of women 
in political participation in the peace process during the ongoing conflict negotia-
tions from 2004 until the present time. The author examines the cases of the Malay 
Muslims, who are the dominated populations in this violent conflict region and a 
significant minority group in Thailand, and the non-Malays who are also active 
in paving the way for peace making in various forms of activity in southern border 
provinces of country. Gender analysis of the intertwined ethno-religious and political 
identities of the Malays and non-Malays demands a need to reorientation of the 
concept of peace and security which contributed to illuminate deeply understanding of 
the society during conflict resolution.
Keywords: Malay Muslim Women, Political Participation, Peacebuilding, South-
ern Thailand
INTRODUCTION: THE MALAYS IN THE SOUTH
The Muslim population in Thailand is a minority. Islam is the country’s second 
largest religion.2 The position of Muslims in modern Thai polity in existing 
academic works at the turn of the century was confined to the Malay Muslims 
of southern Thailand and the relationship between the political construction 
that rejects the legitimacy of the secularized Buddhist polity3 and Thai Buddhist 
1 The author would like to aknowledge the support by Thai Research Fund (TRF) for 
this research-based article and expresses her deepest grattitute. It is also the intention of the 
author to credit the Annual International Conference on Islamic Studies (AICIS) 2017 orga-
nized by the Ministry of Religious Affair of the Republic of Indonesia in which the author was 
invited to present the paper. It was held in Jakarta on 22-25 November 2017
2 Academics and Muslim authorities like the Chularajmontri consider the official 
Muslim population estimated by the state (4.5 percent) to be on the low side. For more in-
formation, see National Statistics Office of Thailand (2005), Bajunid (1999) and Yusuf (1998).
3 For the term “secularized Buddhist polity, see Somboon Suksamran, “Buddhism, 
Political Authority, and Legitimacy in Thailand and Cambodia” in Buddhist Trends in 
Southeast Asia (1993, 101-144). Interference has occurred since the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 
1909. For example, during the of King Vajiravudh (1910–25) — who emphasized allegiance 
to the Thai nation, monarchy, and Buddhism — the Compulsory Primary Education Act 
of 1921 required all Malay children to attend Siamese primary school for at least four years. 
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political cultures. In the broader context of Muslim studies in Thailand, however, 
Forbes and Scupin made valuable contributions to understanding Muslims on the 
national level, especially within the historical and political contexts of modern 
Thailand (Bajunid, 1999).
Before the great waves of Chinese immigration in the early 20th century, 
Muslims were the largest single minority in Thailand and were by no means 
restricted to the southern provinces. Bajunid (1988, 2005) distinguishes 
between ‘assimilated’ and ‘unassimilated’ Muslims in Thailand. The former 
consist of diverse ethnic groups such as the Arabs, Pathans, and Thai-Malays. 
The ‘unassimilated’ group consists of ethnic Malay Muslims in the southern 
border provinces. With regard to the Malays living in central Thailand, they 
were brought there from the former Malay state of Patani as prisoners-of-war 
in 1785, when the Northern Malay Sultanate of Patani was conquered by Siam 
(Wyatt, 1984: 151). Many were retained as slaves and principal courtiers of the 
king and settled in villages near Bangkok.4
Thai-Pattani relations are a source of chronic controversy of nation-state 
issues in the southernmost boundary which Thongchai Winichakul (1994) 
called the ‘geo-body’ of nation. Melayu Pattani, who are Muslims, struggle 
like other minorities over the notion of ‘Thai-ness, since the conceptions of 
Thai chauvinism and geo-body resulted in a territorially and culturally unified 
Siam nation-state with fixed borders. Malay ethnic identity as expressed in 
terms of language, dress, education, history, and custom was consistently 
discouraged by the state.5
The Thai state has attempted to replace Malay ethnicity with a religious 
label, ‘Thai Muslim’ or ‘Thai Islam,’ hoping that this change would 
contribute to the overall goal of assimilation. The notion of an Islamic state 
of Pattani, which is closely related to the Pattani Malay ethnic nationalist 
movement, is another factor within the contemporary politicization of religion 
accommodating the violent conflict in southern Thailand (Jory, 2007; 
Davisakd, 2008; Thanet, 2008; Kobkua, 2008; Yusuf, 2007b; Gilquin, 2005; 
Gowing, 1985). It is generally understood that the problem concerning the 
Another important case occurred during the World War II under the leadership of Marshal 
Phibunsongkram, when Thai nationalism was imposed in the southern border provinces. 
Chaiwat Satha-Anand describes how the police tore up Malay attire and beat people, men 
and women, who wore it (Satha-Anand 2008, 161).
4 The people of the former Patani sultanate were usually referred to as Melayu (Malay), 
even during the reign of the modernizing King Chulalongkorn who abolished the Patani 
sultanate and absorbed of the former sultanate’s territories into the Thai state.
5 The perception of Malayness, marked by language, cultural practices, religion and 
an important shared sense of history of being a people conquered by the Siamese (Thai 
Buddhist) powers, has caused the Malays to see themselves as a distinct ethnic group vis-à-
vis Thai Buddhists.
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identity of the kingdom’s subjects began when the state embraced nationalism 
as an essential part of its nation building, starting in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century.
Consequently, Malay Muslims in Thailand consider themselves different in 
ethno religious terms. Socio-political and cultural aspects of life are interpreted 
and perceived through the lens of ethnic identity. The Thai political invasion in the 
region in the early twentieth century led to unprecedented cultural confrontation 
in the area between the Malays and the new Thai bureaucrats sent from Bangkok 
to rule them. Moreover, the rising of Malay nationalism in Southeast Asia in the 
1940s has furthered this ethnic divide in southern Thailand.
By using the terms ‘Thai Muslim’ or ‘Thai Islam,’ the Thai state moved in the 
subsequent period to embrace religious plurality. However, Buddhism remained 
closely associated with Thai identity6, while Malay Muslims still appear to resist 
assimilation into Thai society, despite the fact that their identities underwent 
a great deal of transformation. The political instability of the post-Second 
World War period also threatened to undermine Thailand’s claim for political 
legitimacy in the South. Malay Muslim elites tried to gain advantages from the 
political situation in the area, for example by demanding the institution of Muslim 
family law, educational quotas, and dress codes.
The revitalization of Islam in Thailand in the 1970s was related to a new political 
phenomenon in the earlier age of imperialism when the modern Thai state elites 
opened Siam for inter-state relations.7 Although Thailand was independent, it 
was compelled to adopt policies similar to the other colonial neighbours in order 
to survive amidst colonizing powers. The sense of a subsiding identity crisis arose 
from the growing familiarity with western cultures among the Thai elite. The 
outbreak of a communist insurgency in 1950s brought a new identity crisis for the 
Thai upper class. At the same time, the reworking of Thai history concerning 
6 According to Surin Pitsuwan (1985: 68-70), King Wachiravut’s rule marked the begin-
ning of a long and torturous struggle to widen the sphere and deepen the level of autonomy for 
the Malay-Muslims of Patani based on specific ethnic differences. However, the very nature 
of the Thai state and its bureaucratic set-up did not permit such royal policy to be fully pro-
mulgated. The bureaucracy was dominated by Thai Buddhists, who maintained their sense 
of ethnic Thai chauvinism. These bureaucrats could not be expected to conscientiously 
carry out state policies that would respect regional differences and preserve ethnic autonomy. 
Special treatment of the Malay-Muslims of Patani would have contradicted the single most 
ideological contribution the king himself made to the Thai nation: nationalism. Between 
the two objectives of the cultivation of a Thai national identity (with the Thai language, Thai 
religion-Theravada Buddhism, and Thai culture implied by it) and the preservation of a mi-
nority’s separate identity, the former was always the priority of the Thai bureaucrats.
7 The country’s name was changed from Siam to Thailand during the tenure of the 
first Phibulsongkhram government (1938-44). During this period, which coincided with 
World War II, the country was dominated by an energetic and aggressive brand of national-
ism which influenced both domestic and foreign policies.
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ethnic minorities by various intellectuals has brought the Muslim youth into 
negotiations with the ‘homogenous’ Thai identity discourse (Jory, 2003).
PIOUS PATANI MALAY MUSLIM WOMEN IN TRANSITION
In searching for contemporary historical literature on Malay Muslim women 
and the opportunities for access to political participation, I found a pioneering 
study in the 1980s by Thai anthropologist Chavivun Prachuabmoh found that 
ethnic identity maintenance is based primarily on women’s activities in public 
and domestic spheres.8 She proposed an interesting argument of ethnicity based 
on cultural background—linguistic, religious, and symbolic features—among the 
Thai, Chinese, and Malay in Thailand’s southernmost provinces.
Chavivun argues that Malay identities cannot be sufficiently explained by 
history or cultural symbols. The Thai Muslims of the Deep South, she writes, 
maintain their distinctive ethnicity through various social organizations such 
as family, kinship, community, friendship networks, and religious education. 
Women have the primary responsibility for maintaining ethnic symbols such 
as clothing and language. They are expected to minimize interaction with 
outsiders and their strong opposition to intermarriage. Chavivun views the ethnic 
relations of the Malays as gendered. Women are expected to uphold prohibitions 
against intermarriage and to cover their bodies more completely than are non-
Muslim women. Moreover, women are more inclined to maintain their cultural 
symbols better than men. They may have greater influence on their children 
because their teaching of how to be nayu is a more intimate and emotional process, 
while male ethnicity is more heavily oriented towards formal organizations. 
Men spend more time outside the household and have avoidant relationships 
with their children (1989: 113-150).
Even though Patani historical studies portrayal an interesting aspect of the Sultanah 
or the queens during 1584 until the mid-1600s which was constituted as the 
golden age of Patani, there is a certain formal political context within. The four 
women Ratu (Queens)9 had been involved a top position in political realm. The 
situation relates to Patani’s independence from consolidating Buddhist Siamese 
Kingdom of Ayutthaya who succeeds in defending their land. However, there is 
8 Her first study is a doctoral dissertation entitle, The Role of Women in Maintaining 
Ethnic Identity and Boundaries: A Case of Thai-Muslims (Malay Speaking Group) in Southern 
Thailand.
9 Ratu Hijau (the Green Queen), Ratu Biru (the Blue Queen), Ratu Ungu (the Violet 
Queen) and Ratu Kuning (the Yellow Queen) expanded their political power to Kelantan 
and Terengganu. See, Ibrahim Syukri. History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani. Translated by 
Bailey Conner and John N. Miksic, Southeast Asia Series. Ohio: Centre for International Studies, 
Ohio University, 1985.
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no treat with concerning an agenda for peacemaking from the queens. Toward 
the end of the century when Patani was partly as a consequence of Siamese 
invasions in 1674 and 1688, a Chinese visitor observed that “Patani is a country 
ruled by a Queen and not a country of military prowess.”10 McCargo, a British 
political scientist who completed research in Pattani a decade ago and released 
Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (2008) among 
other several pieces, states that these former female Malay Sultanates ruled for 
a time. Moreover, there was no evidence that Pattani was ever governed by a 
council of Ulama. The Qur’an was also never used as the basic law in this area.
Moreover, I found a story of the recent group of the “Three Tiger Warriors” 
(Saam Taharn Sua)’ story compelling, but unfortunately there were no documents 
clarify their political participation role in the Malay Muslim community. This lack 
of documentation includes the debate over the relationship between ethnicity and 
the Malay Muslim women’s peace movement, which has not been acknowledged. 
According to Ismail Ali, the former director of the College of Islamic Studies, Prince 
of Songkla University, Pattani, the name Saam Taharn Sua was bestowed by local 
Malay Muslims. The word tiger (sua) refers to women who have the capacity 
to seek and teach religious knowledge in the community, as well as to establish 
their own study group. They also helped each other to campaign to vote for one 
of their younger “inner circle” leader, Maraim Samoh or kak Yae who is a friend 
of Saam Taharn Sua, to succeed in election under Social Action Party (Phak Kit 
Sangkhom), however, fail to gain election in 1976.11 This failure did not devalue 
their leadership in collaborating with Malay Muslim community to have 
women’s involvement in political party.
In the aftermath of the failure of Social Action Party in Pattani, kak Yae turned 
into dakwah, religious mission, activity. She set up an orphaned girl school in 
her own community in the beginning of 1990s which is usually supported by 
the people of the surrounding villages, local religious leaders, and the three 
tiger warriors. Situations like this, in which Muslim women set up a group and 
empower themselves as well as other people through religious knowledge and affirm 
their leadership role in modern political arena, had never existed previously in 
southern border provinces of Thailand. Thus, the group challenges the traditional 
viewpoint of women leadership through sophisticated engagement in political 
activism and Islamic education.
10 Lorraine M. Gesick. In the Land of Lady White Blood: Southern Thailand and the Mean-
ing of History. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1995.
11 After October 14, 1973 uprising against the military dictatorship and the October 
6, 1976 massacre of student movement or both October events provided spaces for a certain 
group of Muslim women in the South to be involved in political reform. In case of kak Yae, 
she was encouraged by her husband and local Malay politicians to be a candidate for Social 
Action Party right after her graduation from Malaysia.
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The activity of kak Yae with the Saam Taharn Sua’ support represented a major 
shifted in structures of Malay culture, political role, and Islamic authority. In 
Malay society and the village in particular, people’s relationship is very close. The 
views and actions of leaders effected commoners strongly. The alim, religious 
leader, is at the same time political leader of the village. Kak Yae has curtailed 
male domination in leadership, especially in core religious space— orphaned 
girl school—for decades. She holds the ultimate sources of Islamic knowledge, 
the Qur’an and the sunnah, in her school and classes. She pointed to the issue 
of female authority in seeking and sharing knowledge by choosing the frame of 
power and responsibility to strengthen society by referring to the hadith and the 
Qur’an12 and saying that “we are a part”. For kak Yae, the increasing of women 
in attendance at prayers and lessons is a good sign of balancing women’s 
right in Muslim community. Her role is played in religious and social leadership of 
the community.
Within the three tiger warriors group are three women who were recognized 
for their bravery as well as for their move towards leading a more religious life. 
The first woman, Hamidah Adae or kak Zu, was awarded an honorary doctorate 
of Islamic Studies from Fatoni University, the first private Islamic university in 
Thailand, in March 2015. In 2011, Hamidah retired from the College of Islamic 
Studies of Prince of Songkla University. However, she continues to play a role 
as an advisor of the Network of the Southern Muslim Women’s Association. 
She was also often invited by Fatoni University to give lectures and share her 
knowledge with female halaqah (study groups).
Hamidah finished her upper secondary school secular education at the same 
time as thanawiyah or higher religious secondary level from Wattanatham Islam 
School, which is known as Por Ming Pondok, Pattani.13 It is important to note 
here that during the Sarit Thanarat government (1958–1963), Thailand 
attempted to integrate Malay-Muslim people into mainstream Thai society 
with new educational policies, which included transforming pondok into 
private Islamic schools in 1959. Consequently, it increased the number of Muslim 
women who began enrolling in private Islamic schools (Tawee et al. 1987). In 
the case of Hamidah, she was a female religious teacher at Por Ming Pondok 
for several years before continuing her studies abroad with the support of the 
school, community, and her family in particular. Her grandfather is a respected 
tok guru, or religious teacher, of the community.
12 The Hadith that kak Yae mentioned is about continuously seeking knowledge until 
death and the Qur’an, 20:114 “..., O Lord advance me in knowledge...”.
13 Islamic private school offered religious and secular knowledge which the govern-
ment-approved schools were divided into four levels, elementary or primary school curric-
ulum (Ibtidaiyah); the middle school curriculum (Mutawassitah); the secondary (Thanawi-
yah) and the higher secondary (Thanawiyah Khassah) school curriculums.
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Khadijah Binti Abdul Rahman or kak Joh is the second of the Three Tigers. She 
is currently an educational administrator of her family’s school, Bamrung Islam 
School or Bra-o Pondok, in Pattani. The school was initially run by Khadijah’s 
father, Abdurrahman Japakiya, who is a well-known traditionalist orthodox 
religious teacher, and later by other male members of Japakiya’s family. Ismail 
Lutfi Japakiya, Khadijah’s brother, the most respected contemporary religious leader 
of the Saudi style salafism in southern Thailand14, later became chairman of the 
school. He is the founding of rector of Fatoni University (formerly known as 
Yala Islamic University). At the present time, Khadijah is the administrator of 
the pre-primary school Bamrung Islam School. She continues to organize female 
halaqah with school teachers and the members of religious women’s activist group.
Hamidah and Khadijah wanted to gain more Islamic knowledge as well as 
recognition among men and the community when they experienced teaching 
at pondoks. In the 1970s the best place for Muslim women from the Deep South 
to facilitate higher religious education in terms of common culture and language 
as well as proximity was Malaysia. Yayasan Pengajian Tinggi Islam Nilam Puri 
or Nilam Puri Islamic Higher Education Institute (Nilam Puri, for short) in 
Kota Bahru, Kelantan was a popular destination for many Muslim youth from 
southern Thailand to continue their religious study after the thanawiyah level.15 
Hamidah soon earned a scholarship for a master’s degree in Shariah (Islamic 
Law) at al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. She has been acknowledged by a 
number of Muslim scholars as a knowledgeable female who was the first Pattani 
Muslim woman to achieve a master’s degree from al-Azhar University. Khadijah 
returned to her father’s pondok after obtaining an ijazah certificate on Islamic 
Theology and Community (Usuluddin Dan Kemasyarakatan) from Nilam Puri in 
1987.16
The last leading member of the Three Tigers is Maesonk Yusok or kak Sonk, 
a tough, brave, outspoken woman. Maesonk is an active teacher at Sas Sanu 
Patham School or Bana Pondok, Pattani, where she finished her thanawiyah. 
Maesonk was not able to continue her own studies at Nilam Puri as planned 
because of poverty, but achieved her goal vicariously by providing her nieces 
14 Salafism is one of Islamic reform movement that urged Muslim fellows to return to, 
and strictly follow the sacred sources, and purify Islamic ideas and practices from later inno-
vation (bid‘ah). The Salafi movement has advocated for a social change through tarbiyyah 
(education) by working within the Thai constitutional framework.
15 Yayasan Pengajian Tinggi Islam Nilam Puri, the first Islamic higher education in 
Kelantan was established by the state government in 1965. The institute offers B.A. for two 
departments, Shariah (Islamic Law) and Education. See Abdullah, 1973: 29-75.
16 Ijazah means license or authorization. It is an identical instrument of academia in 
the highest degree of Islamic educational system from the classical period of Islam. See, J. Meri 
and J. Bacharach, Medieval Islamic Civilization, volume 1 an Encyclopedia (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2006), 201–2.
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and nephews with funding for higher education. Apart from teaching, Maesonk 
obtained administrative experience by running a profitable cooperative school 
store for more than a decade. She organized Muslim youth and women’s camps 
in the villages every semester with the help of Khadijah, Hamidah, Mariam 
and other leading Malay Muslim women in the Deep South. The camp, held 
during the semester break when they returned to Pattani. It focused on Islamic 
knowledge and practices, particularly women’s roles and duties according to Islam.
Maesonk and Hamidah chose not to get married although a number of men 
approached them. They relied on the precedence set by Umme Kulsoom, 
daughter of Abu Bakr, a senior companion of Prophet Muhammad who refused 
a marriage proposal by Umar, an influential caliph. While Maesonk accepts that 
Islam encourages Muslims marry. However, to be a single woman is not fitna, 
disorder or immorality. She worries about understanding of people over fitna, 
which often focused on women troublesome. However, she feels that forced 
marriage against a person’s will is not an Islamic tradition. Hamidah views the 
criticism leveled against her for not being married as a challenge, particularly in 
her role of active agent in the resurgence of a religious movement. She counters 
by providing a reinterpretation of the scripture regarding unmarried life as the 
opportunity to remain autonomous and dedicate her time to social and religious 
devotion.
Hamidah, Maesonk, and Khadijah began teaching in their own villages and 
the pondoks with which they are connected in the mission of Islamic revival. They 
chose to provide lessons independently without the assistance of traditional male 
religious leaders, except for an aspiring reformist scholar, Ismail Lutfi Japakiya. 
Their efforts to reach out to young Malay women in the three provinces of 
Southern Thailand, and Pattani in particular were acknowledged for 
promoting widespread shifts in religious practice among the locals. They later 
directed groups of Malay Muslim women in adopting a more Islamic observant 
lifestyle rather than focus merely on women attire.
The historical context of Muslim women’s veiling is indirectly related to their 
movement, which reveals the diversity and complexity of the narratives involved. 
As discussed earlier, the three tiger warriors were not involved with demonstrators 
at the Yala Central Mosque.17 After finishing their degrees in Malaysia in the mid-
late 1980s, they returned to Pattanti to educate the younger generation about Islam. 
17 One of the most prominent signs of Islamic reawakening in Thailand is linked with 
the Muslim women’s identity marker, the headscarf, which is often called hijab. The so-called 
‘Yala Teacher Training College Incident’ (1987- 1988) in Yala Province discussed below 
caused the emergence of a more conscious ‘self ’ identification within the Muslim community 
in Thailand when Muslim women were not allowed to wear the veil in educational institu-
tions. More information, please see “Hijab and Moments of Legitimation: Islamic Resurgence 
in Thai Society.”, 1994.
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While they kept their circle away from the Yala hijab incident, they recognized 
that the movement led to the appearance of a symbol of Islamic femininity 
widely and publicly.
They based their political agenda in the realm of religious authority to interpret 
the texts from a women’s perspective, and became intellectuals who transmitted 
knowledge to others and encouraged their students to dress modestly. However, 
they also attempted to go beyond the outward appearance of clothing, by 
emphasizing religious education and philosophy and how it can empower 
women through knowledge. Hamidah states that there are various concepts that 
define Muslim women’s dress. While some terms have been used widely, for 
instance, hijab (veil) and niqab (face veil), but these terms are not mentioned 
in the passages of the Qur’an. Hamidah has observed a certain term, veil. It 
became a measure of Muslim women’s aurah or the intimate parts of body 
which must be covered with clothes.
For Hamidah, this is not a specific term limits only on women’s body. Thus, 
she believed that women should have the same religious education as men. She 
referred to the verses of the Qur’an18 which particularly revealed the equal rights 
and spiritual between men and women. Learning was commendable. It helped 
women to improve their knowledge and change environment also through 
self-disciplines. Preaching Islam for the group and their allies was based on 
good religious education and moral. Moreover, Hamidah raised the case of A’isha, 
the wife of the Prophet who was a Hadith-narrator and believed to have reported 
and taught 2,210 traditions.19
In practice, these women provided literacy course and basic of Qur’anic study 
groups for women and girls in particular, beside male and female youth in their 
own communities. Their efforts began by reaching out to the Muslim women 
and younger females in leading educational religious circle (halaqah) in the 
privacy of homes, neighbours’ homes, and educational institutions. There is a 
18 “O mankind! reverence your Guardian-Lord, Who created you from a single per-
son created of like nature his mate and from them twain scattered (like seeds) countless men 
and women; reverence Allah through Whom ye demand your mutual (rights) and (rever-
ence) the wombs (that bore you): for Allah ever watches over you.” (4:1), “If any do deeds of 
righteousness be they male or female and have faith, they will enter Heaven, and not the least 
injustice will be done to them.” (4: 124) and “For Muslim men and women for believing 
men and women for devout men and women for true men and women for men and women 
who are patient and constant for men and women who humble themselves for men and wom-
en who give in charity for men and women who fast (and deny themselves) for men and 
women who guard their chastity and for men and women who engage much in Allah’s praise 
for them has Allah prepared forgiveness and great reward.” (33: 25).
19 See also Spellberg, D. A. Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past: The Legacy of 
A’isha bint Abi Bakr. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993.) and Grey, Sarah, Wom-
en’s Role as Teachers, Leaders, and Contributors to the Waqf in Damascus. (Research Report 
for Julia Meltzer, 14, 2014).
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leader of each group who received another training course weekly or monthly by 
the three tiger warriors under the structure of family or cell (usrah). Consequently, 
relationship between halaqah leaders and usrah trainers was a close one.
The environment that Muslim women could not only read or recite but also discuss 
the ideas related to the Qur’anic verses instead of depending religious specialists is a 
new system of learning among Malay Muslim women in southernmost provinces 
of Thailand. Joining the three tiger warriors and alliance halaqah meant becoming 
modern in religious practices. They referred to a particular verse of the Qur’an 
that women were also called to participate in social reform.20 Women gathered 
to pray and learn together as well as recognized as religious leaders. However, 
they experienced tension from the criticised of traditional Malay Muslims in 
the area. They insisted that there should be no obstacles for female teachers 
and preachers, family and community should gladly allow them to pursue the 
activity.
The core of the three tiger warriors’ ideology is empowering women to 
religious knowledge and education, women’s attire and veil became an issue for 
justification when they confronted with traditional religious leaders who possess 
as the legislative body of religious authority. Regarding Muslim women’s identity 
marker, Hamidah observed that before the 1980s, many Malay Muslim women 
in the southernmost provinces of Thailand wore short- or three quarter-sleeved 
blouses with a long wrap skirt or sarong. The traditional baju kurung, a knee- 
length blouse worn over a long bright floral patterned skirt, was worn on special 
occasions, such as weddings and certain Islamic celebration days known as 
hari raya.21 These dress patterns were considered modest according to Malay 
tradition.
The idea of veiling appeared among educated middle-class modernists and 
elite traditionalists. Working-class women, however, were much less involved in 
the movement. Unveiled women who dress in kain lepas are recognized as not being 
influenced by the spirit of Islamic resurgence. The hijab movement in Thailand 
has changed similarly to the way it has in many other Muslim communities. 
Aihwa Ong applied Soheir Morsy’s term “depeasantization” to describe middle-class 
women and religious nationalism in Malaysia. She described the scene in Sungai 
Jawa, where groups of village girls enter teacher colleges and universities 
wearing Islamic clothes. In the view of village elders, the religious outfit is 
20 The Qur’anic verse 16:97 revealed Muslim women and their ability to exercise free-
dom of religious and other life choices. (“Anyone who works righteousness, male or female, 
while believing, we will surely grant them a happy life in this world, and we will surely pay 
them their full recompense (on the Day of Judgment)for their righteous works”).
21 Hari Raya consists of several celebration days, including Eid al-Fitri, the end of the 
fast, Ramadan, and Eid al Adha, the feast of the sacrifice or hajj celebration day.
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inappropriate for life in the village. It is the costume of an educated woman and 
a symbol of depeasantization. It has replaced the body-fitting batik sarung-kebaya 
of the days before Islamic resurgence.22
The narratives of women’s religious identity reflect valuable and diverse 
viewpoints regarding the emergence of the veil in Thai society through self-
portraits and explanations by Muslim women activists who were involved both 
directly and indirectly with the gradual change in ideas about Muslim women’s 
role in religious life. Even though current pious Islam is intended to be visible 
in public, which for women is through the veil, veiling itself is not the main 
issue that the three tiger warriors and their networks point to as the foreground 
of the reform agenda.
Islamic resurgence in Malaysia is rooted in the early 1970s and resulted in 
economic growth and the expansion of educational opportunities among 
Malaysians. At the same time, rivalry among Islamization projects has resulted 
in an intensification of Malay gender differences, segregation and inequality. 
Pressures for an Islamic state have been especially strong within Kelantan, where 
the opposition Islamist party, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS, Parti Islam 
SeMalaysia) has had considerable electoral success. In 1965, the Kelantan 
state government established an institute of Islamic Higher Learning known as 
Yayasan Pengajian Tinggi Islam Nilam Puri, which was the first Islamic higher 
education institution in Kelantan (Stivens, 2006).
Hamidah and Khadijah, who came from Pattani, enrolled in religious studies 
in order to improve their knowledge. Studying at Nilam Puri enabled them 
to experience a new atmosphere that addressed the students’ enthusiasm for 
Islamic studies at a higher education level. Moreover, they participated in Islamic 
student groups and Islamic missionary activities known as dakwah. Students who 
participated in dakwah activities also organized halaqah (study groups) at Nilam 
Puri to discuss political Islam.
These leading women recognize themselves as initiated female informal political 
leaders in southern Thailand who brought certain changes and knowledge 
to their communities. Hamidah does not deny that there is resistance from 
traditionalist members who have accused her and other Muslim women in 
the reform network of devaluing Malay cultural norms and replacing them 
with Wahhabism.23 The women encountered with resistance from Islamic 
22 See Ong, “State Versus Islam: Malay Families, Women’s Bodies and the Body Pol-
itic.” in Ong, Aihwa and Peletz, Michael G. (eds.). Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender 
and Body Politics in Southeast Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1995:159−194.
23 The Wahhabi movement led by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab of the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century, gave rise to variegated Salafi reform movement offshoots, rang-
ing from political activism – whose main aims are to capture state power through violent 
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traditionalist members who resent them for devaluing Malay cultural norms 
and replacing them with Wahhabism. However, women have been criticized 
far less than have male reformist leaders. Purportedly, the movements backing 
the Three Tigers are also influenced by the salafi and Muslim Brotherhood 
movement. It showed an emergent Islamic radicalism on a global level in local 
context.
In addition, the reformist movement has had subtle influence on religious 
educational reform.24 Khadijah, in our conversation, also notes a significant 
impact of reformist trends on Islamic education in which women play a 
strong role. In her case, she works at her father’s pondok and provides support 
and administrative assistance to Dr. Ismail Lutfi, who is currently involved in 
enhancing higher Islamic education. Khadijah closed the conversation 
by emphasizing the process of tarbiyah, which can gradually lead to changes 
in women. She believes that female leadership in political and peace process 
implementation scheme in present days became an inadvertent fashion in the 
Deep South Thailand. 
WOMEN DURING THE CURRENT WAVE OF VIOLENT CONFLICT
I mentioned specifically earlier about the Three Tiger Warriors group’s 
activity in relation to Islamic revitalization during the last two decades. While 
the insurgency of ethno regionalist tension in the new wave of violent conflict, 
since 2004, have represented the tide of resentment in this region. The conflict 
is primarily the components which the Malay Muslims at the southern border 
provinces and the Thai state are essentially fighting. Historically, Malay Sultanate 
of Patani, which was established in the 13th century as a Buddhist Sultanate 
before Islam became the dominant faith in the early 15th century. In 1900s, the 
means in order to enforce Islamic law from the top – to political quietism, whose adherents 
believe that religious change must come in stages, and that the current context necessi-
tates tarbiyyah (education and cultivation to encourage proper Muslim practices). Aryud 
Yahprung (2014: 18) states in his recent doctoral study that Islamic reform in the southern 
border provinces of Thailand entered a new chapter when a group of Pattani male doctoral 
students who graduated from institutions in Saudi Arabia returned to Thailand in the late 
1980s. These leading reformists are Ismail Ali (1950-), Abdul Halim Saising (1947-), Jihad 
bin Muhammad (1951- 2002), and Ismail Lutfi Chapakia (1950-present). They launched a 
loose network of Islamic reformism and called themselves the salafi.
24 The Salafi group in southern Thailand which I referred to in Muhammad Ilyas’s 
study earlier, emphasizes the reform of the Muslim community by reforming Muslim edu-
cation. On the one hand, they set up Islamic schools, an Islamic university, and other learn-
ing institutions, such as language colleges, Islamic educational foundations, and printing 
houses. On the other hand, they propagated their Islamic reformism through the informal 
learning process of mosque-based private lectures, study circles, and preaching through lo-
cal radio stations, and the Internet (Ibid: 8). See also Farish A. Noor in The Madrasa in Asia: 
Political Activism and Transnational Linkage (2008: 141-167).
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Thai state alternated between implementing strategies of assimilation and 
accommodation. The Thai state has continued its goal of incorporating the Malay 
citizens into an overarching Thai identity. Within this period, spontaneous and 
sporadic rebellions emerged, and Malay populations struggled against state 
authority. The current insurgency is also associated with regional economic 
disparities, unemployment, crime, and illegal drug use.
The attempts to establish dialogue as a way towards political solution have been 
made since 2005.25 The groups of women who are the major victims of the unrest 
also attempt to find alternative paths to build up peace in their society. Studies 
suggest that Muslim and non-Muslims women in this region are very heavily 
engaged with local women’s networks, associations, civil society organization and 
non-governmental organizations.26 The groups tend to be led by highly capable and 
well educated middle-class women, who have university degree, and student 
volunteers from local universities. They also train women from the villages 
through various workshops and projects that often have support from national 
and international organizations that are engaged in peacebuilding efforts. 
For example, “Wanita: Women’s Power for a Better Society” Project is the 
development plan that had been carried out during 2011-2014 to expand the 
network of local permanent service for women and children who had been mostly 
affected by violence.
In this part, I explore the continuum of the activity of the three tiger warriors’ 
network particularly their idea of peace process. According to different vision 
and framework between women in the Islamic reformation movement and the 
grassroots movement, the notion of peacebuilding consequently carries into 
various foundations. The former group of women’s movement focuses on the 
inner sentiment, which the leaders equate with takwa, the feeling of inner peace. 
Malay ethnicity becomes deessentialized, however, religious identity of being 
Muslim women have maintained through faith purification. The greater influence 
on the young generations from their teachings of how to be peace builder is a 
25 McCargo, D. Southern Thailand: From Conflict to Negotiations, Lowy I nstitue for 
International Policy, 2014.
26 A.K. Molnar, “Chapter 22: Women’s Agency in the Malay Muslim Communities 
of Southern Thailand” in P. Liamputtong, ed., Contemporary Socio-Cultural and Political Per-
spectives in Thailand. 2016: 350; Joint CEDAW Shadow Report 2016 “Situation of the Rights 
of Malay Muslim Women in Southern Thailand”, 2017; Assessment Report The Develop-
ment of Sustainable Community Extension Services for Women and Children Most-affected 
by the Unrest and Violence in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand”, 2015; JPF in-
terview, “Malay Muslim women during the seminar on Access to Justice of Women in the 
Southern Border Provinces”, 2014; The Political Participation of Village Woman Development 
Committee In Changwat Pattani, Master of Education thesis in Community Development 
Education, Prince of Songkla University, 2004.; Hafissa Salae, Muslim women amidst Con-
flict: The Transition from Victim to Peace Activist, MA Thesis, Sociology Department of 
Sociology and Anthropology, Thammasat University, 2010.
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more intimate with the inner disposition. They believe that to fight for a better 
inner spirit of trust in God could lift women’s capacity in responding to peaceful 
society. Meanwhile, bringing ethnicity as a mean to build up society is heavily 
oriented towards organizations of the grassroots civil society.
According to Hamidah, she continues to play a key role in the network of the 
Southern Muslim Women’s Association and the Council of Muslim Women’s 
Organization Cooperation for Peace. These coordinating bodies for women’s 
movement which she and her allies have been engaged provided a more explicit 
activity associated with the Al-Salam Institute of Fatoni University. This is an 
institute to promote an outreach program of Islamic activity. They view Muslim 
women’s public activities involve in a frame of Islamic values.
Multaqa Muslimat, the conference of Muslim women, is an important case of 
women space which the Council of Muslim Women’s Organization Cooperation 
for Peace relates their activity with the situation of the unrest. They have actively 
collaborated in the effort to expand dakwah activities and Islamic reform 
knowledge. Hamidah considers the meeting as a potential mean of creating a new 
network to support peace making process from religious perspective. The strategy of 
the Muslim women’s movement could be changed according to local contexts, 
however. The impact of violent conflict in the region is one of the major forces that 
led Muslim women in the local reform movement, which is basically concerned 
with Islamic education, to be opened for a new frame of thought. Nonetheless, 
Hamidah asserts that engaging in the collective community still requires basic 
principles of the movement, that is, authentic expression of Islamic knowledge 
in corollary with tarbiyah and dakwah ideologies.
Networks of the three tigers and Council of Muslim Women’s Organization 
Cooperation for Peace have also engaged with political and governmental bodies in 
conflict area, such as, the Pattani Provincial Administration Organization (Pattani 
PAO). The pious Malay Muslim women desire for justice and peaceful society 
within their circles amidst several groups of women that have been established 
during the conflict situation in the region. Nevertheless, they have not engaged 
directly in peace-building efforts in collaborate with non-Muslim or Buddhist 
NGOs in the Deep South unlike the grassroots NGOs Muslim women’s network 
that have collaborating openly with the non-believers.
Discussing further on the role of peacebuilding among the pious oriented 
Malay women, the emergence of boundaries among women of different 
Islamic orientations in southern Thailand indicates their presence in public 
space. This space was initially organized by the first generation of reform activists 
and Islamic intellectuals in coping with mechanisms vis-à-vis the predominant 
ideology according to women in Islamic discourse. My contention is that it still 
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remains with some observable contexts from reformist women when they have 
involved in politics, reaffirmation of the inner peace narrative, and partnership 
of the movement.
The inner peace narrative is also a state apparatus of power to national 
development in modern Thailand. Additionally, the Thai state benefits from 
these “Muslim middle-class morals” and values as they have been interpreted 
by educated reformist Muslims. It contributes to the vigorous public forum with 
powerfully defined women as the hope of the Muslim community. Precisely 
because of the need for development in attempting to create moderate Muslim 
life during times of violent conflict, the state eventually has to engage with 
reformist Muslim women’s activism. Observable scenes in regard to the venue 
of the conference in Pattani in 2010 and 2011, people who had been invited to 
the stage which selected different purposes were politically organized. Those 
who advocated Islamic reform to be applied for all women in Islamic history 
persuaded as the primary objective of the forum. They were friends and relatives 
of the scholars of Prince of Songkla University and Fatoni University as 
well as being represented by PAO institute.
CONCLUSION
As Abu-Lughod emphasizes on ethnography of the particular27, which I apply to 
discuss about people in the communities that I study to write about Malay Muslim 
women and conflict resolution, it is regarded as the study of the capacity for self-
determination or agency of women in conflict area. Moreover, women’s agency in 
Mahmood perspective demonstrated in embodied ethical practice. She applies it 
in her famous study of the Muslim women’s mosque movement in Egypt that the 
movement typically involved some degrees of pietization in which the ordinary 
lives of Muslims were increasingly brought within a framework of devotion and 
pious practice.28
To understand the current situation of pious women’s movement towards the 
issue of peacebuilding and their roles in Malay Muslim society, it could be 
reflected the identity of the minority. The dynamic of making peace in the 
context of ethnic Malay Muslim society proved the concept of inner peaceful 
mind of pious members. It functioned significantly among the groups of 
Islamic movement which adherence to its executive principles throughout 
the imagined peaceful society. Interestingly, they interpreted peace from a 
27 Abu-Lughod, Lila. “Writing Against Culture” in Recapturing Anthropology. Rich-
ard Fox, ed. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press: 137-162.
28 Mahmood, Saba. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005.
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context-oriented perspective as a metaphor for the problems of the people 
in southern Thailand living with conflict. They finally offered a solution to the 
community in applying the implementation of the people in Islamic history.
My argument on the norms of piety was examined in the place where 
religious women were gathering to participate in order to build up peaceful 
society. Several activities of civil society organizations and non-governmental 
organizations working in Patani area have been portrayed in media and daily 
activity on the ground for almost a decade. The resources showed that pious 
salafi women groups in Pattani provided a reference on the growth of Islamization 
in different places, such as madani society with the discourse of civil society. 
Malay Muslim women’s political participation in peace making appeared to be 
mainly actors in this instance. Women from the perspective of religious purification 
and inner peace were not singled out rather mingled with the state in the formal 
political arena.
It illustrated that civil society which could certainly contribute to intellectual 
and social activism as it is essential to develop alongside integrated Islamic 
education. Women’s positions have made reference to the influence of the successful 
of peace building. The notion of agency as accommodated in the complexity of 
experiences of women was split from the subject-centered goals in an attempt 
to parochialize the constitutive relationship between action and embodiment, 
resistance and agency, and self and authority that inform judgment about non-
liberal movements.
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